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Abstract
We study a special three-sided matching game, the so-called supplier-firm-
buyer game, in which buyers and sellers (suppliers) trade indirectly through mid-
dlemen (firms). Stuart (1997) showed that all supplier-firm-buyer games have
non-empty core. We show that for these games the core coincides with the clas-
sical bargaining set (Davis and Maschler, 1967), and also with the Mas-Colell
bargaining set (Mas-Colell, 1989).
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1 Introduction
In their seminal paper Shapley and Shubik (1972) introduced assignment games to study
two-sided matching markets where there are indivisible goods which are traded between
sellers and buyers in exchange for money. Their proof of the non-emptiness of the
core established a fruitful research area. Multi-sided assignment games, however, have
different features. Most importantly, the non-emptiness of the core is not guaranteed
anymore even when there are only three sides in the game, as first demonstrated by
Kaneko and Wooders (1982).
Since the core may be empty for multi-sided assignment games, some authors study
conditions to obtain the non-emptiness of the core (see for instance Quint, 1991; Stuart,
1997; Sherstyuk, 1999; Atay and Nu´n˜ez, 2017). In this paper, we focus on the class
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introduced by Brandenburger and Stuart (1996) and investigated by Stuart (1997).
In the so-called supplier-firm-buyer games, agents in the market are partitioned into
three sides and the groups are arranged along a chain. Sellers (suppliers) and buyers
(customers) are at the two ends of the chain, but trade between them can only be made
via agents in the middle (firms). The valuation on the supplier-firm-buyer triplets is
locally additive, it sums up the potential values of the supplier-firm and of the firm-buyer
matchings, but it is realized only if all three parties cooperate. Stuart (1997) showed
that all supplier-firm-buyer games have non-empty core.
In order to find plausible payoff allocations even in games with empty core, Aumann
and Maschler (1964) suggested a set-valued solution concept that incorporates some
negotiating possibilities of the players. Among the various bargaining sets proposed,
the one investigated by Davis and Maschler (1967) has emerged, for it was proved to be
non-empty whenever the game has a non-empty imputation set (Davis and Maschler,
1967). Mas-Colell (1989) introduced another bargaining set notion based on preimpu-
tations and showed that it is non-empty for any game. Holzman (2001) proved that
for superadditive games the classical (Davis-Maschler) bargaining set is included in the
Mas-Colell bargaining set.
Solymosi (1999) presented a necessary and sufficient condition in terms of the so-
called maximal excess games for the coincidence of the classical bargaining set and the
core in superadditive games. Applied for two-sided assignment games, Solymosi (1999)
proved the coincidence of the classical bargaining set and the core, by using the result of
Granot and Granot (1992) who showed that the class of two-sided assignment games is
closed for taking the maximal excess game at any imputation. Solymosi (2008) extended
this closedness result to all preimputations in classes of partitioning games defined on
a fixed family of basic coalitions and, by using the characterization by Holzman (2001)
of the coincidence between the Mas-Colell bargaining set and the core, established even
this stronger equivalence result for certain subclasses of partioning games, including the
two-sided assignment games.
In this paper, following a similar approach, we show that the class of supplier-firm-
buyer games is closed for taking (the 0-normalization of) the maximal excess game at any
(pre)imputation. Then, we establish the coincidence between the classical bargaining
set and the core, and moreover the coincidence between the Mas-Colell bargaining set
and the core for supplier-firm-buyer games. We restrict ourselves to the supplier-firm-
buyer case, but all the arguments and results in the paper can be extended to m-sided
assignment games with locally additive evaluation on the basic path-coalitions consisting
exactly one agent from each side of the market. We believe that the generalization of
supplier-firm-buyer games is a useful model to study value generation and allocation in
supply chains.
2 Preliminaries
A transferable utility cooperative game (N, v) is a pair where N is a non-empty, finite
set of players and v : 2N → R is a coalitional function satisfying v(∅) = 0. The number
v(S) is regarded as the worth of the coalition S ⊆ N . We identify the game with
its coalitional function since the player set N is fixed throughout the paper. The game
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(N, v) is called 0-normalized if v({i}) = 0 for every i ∈ N . It is superadditive if S∩T = ∅
implies v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ) for every two coalitions S, T ⊆ N .
Given a game (N, v), a payoff allocation x ∈ RN represents the payoffs to the players.
The total payoff to coalition S ⊆ N is denoted by x(S) = ∑i∈S xi if S 6= ∅ and x(∅) = 0.
In a game v, we say the payoff allocation x is efficient, if x(N) = v(N); individually
rational, if xi = x({i}) ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N ; coalitionally rational, if x(S) ≥ v(S) for
all S ⊆ N . The set of preimputations, I∗(v), consists of the efficient payoff vectors, the
set of imputations, I(v), consists of the individually rational preimputations, and the
core, C(v), is the set of coalitionally rational (pre)imputations. We call a game balanced
if its core is non-empty.
Given a game (N, v), the excess of a coalition S ⊆ N at a payoff allocation x is
ex(S) = v(S) − x(S). It is a measure of gain (or loss) to S, if its members disagree
on x and leave it to form their own coalition. On player set N , games v and w are
strategically equivalent, if there exist α > 0 and b ∈ RN such that w(S) = αv(S) + b(S)
for all S ⊆ N . In particular, the 0-normalization of v, denoted by v0, is obtained when
α = 1 and b = (−v({i}) : i ∈ N). Clearly, v is balanced if and only if v0 is balanced.
Aumann and Maschler (1964) argued that the purpose of the game is to reach some
kind of stability, to which the players would or should agree, if they want any agree-
ment. This stability should reflect in some sense the power of each player, but should
be weaker than the sometimes too strong stability the core outcomes capture. Aumann
and Maschler (1964) considered several bargaining sets as reasonable outcomes of ne-
gotiations among coalitions versus coalitions. Davis and Maschler (1967) investigated
another variant, denoted Mi1, where individuals bargain with individuals and proved its
non-emptiness under the very mild condition that the game has imputations. Hence,
it received most attention and became the classical bargaining set. The idea behind
is that an allocation can be considered stable (even if not in the core) if all objections
raised by some player can be nullified by another player.
Let (N, v) be a coalitional game, x ∈ I(v) be an imputation, and i, j ∈ N be two
different players. A pair (S, y) where S ⊆ N and y ∈ RS is an objection of i against j at
x if i ∈ S, j /∈ S, y(S) = v(S), and yl > xl for all l ∈ S. Then, a counter-objection of j
to the objection (S, y) of i at x is a pair (T, z) such that T ⊆ N and z ∈ RT where j ∈ T ,
i /∈ T , z(T ) = v(T ), zk ≥ yk for all k ∈ T ∩S, and zl ≥ xl for all l ∈ T \S. An objection
is justified (in the Davis–Maschler sense) if there does not exist any counter-objection
to it. With these notions of objection and counter-objection, Davis and Maschler (1967)
introduced what is known as the classical bargaining set Mi1.
Definition 1 (Davis and Maschler, 1967). Let (N, v) be a coalitional game. The classical
bargaining set is the set of imputations at which there is no justified objection:
Mi1(v) = {x ∈ I(v) | for every objection at x there is a counter-objection}.
Since no objections, hence no justified objections can be raised at core imputations,
the core is always a subset of the classical bargaining set. Maschler (1976) discussed
a five-player market game for which the bargaining set is a strict superset of the core,
moreover, “for which the bargaining set seems to be intuitively more acceptable than
the (non-empty) core”. On the other hand, Solymosi (2002) proved that in (at most)
4-player games, if the core is non-empty, it coincides with the classical bargaining set.
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Another bargaining set notion was introduced by Mas-Colell (1989). In that concept
coalitions bargain, rather than pairs of players. Moreover, all efficient payoff vectors
are considered, the individual rationality requirement is dropped. Thus, the notions of
objection and counter-objection are modified.
Let (N, v) be a coalitional game. Given a preimputation x ∈ I∗(N, v), we say that
a pair (S, y) where ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and y ∈ RS is a weak objection if y(S) = v(S) and
yl ≥ xl for all l ∈ S with at least one strict inequality for some l ∈ S. Then, a pair
(T, z) where ∅ 6= T ⊆ N and z ∈ RT is a strong counter-objection to objection (S, y) at
x if z(T ) = v(T ) and zl ≥ yl for all l ∈ T ∩ S, zl ≥ xl for all l ∈ T \ S with at least
one strict inequality for some l ∈ T . Using these concepts of weak objection and strong
counter-objection, Mas-Colell (1989) introduced a notion of bargaining set.
Definition 2 (Mas-Colell, 1989). Let (N, v) be a coalitional game. The Mas-Colell
bargaining set is the set of preimputations such that every weak objection at the given
preimputation can be strongly countered:
M∗MC = {x ∈ I∗(v)|every weak objection at x can be strongly countered}.
Mas-Colell (1989) showed that the Mas-Colell bargaining set is non-empty in any
game, and a superset of the core. Mas-Colell (1989) presented a 4-player market game
where the Mas-Colell bargaining set contains imputations outside the (non-empty) core.
On the other hand, it is easily seen that in (at most) 3-player games, if the core is non-
empty, it coincides with the Mas-Colell bargaining set. Holzman (2001) showed that, for
the superadditive games, the classical (Davis – Maschler) bargaining set is included in
the Mas-Colell bargaining set, despite the seemingly not comparable notions of justified
objection used in these two types of bargaining sets.
Given a game (N, v) and a fixed allocation x ∈ RN , the excess values define another
game, called the excess game at x, on the same set of players N by the coalitional
function ex(S) = v(S) − x(S) for all S ⊆ N . In a similar fashion, the maximal excess
game at x is defined by the coalitional function êx(S) = maxT⊆S ex(T ) for all S ⊆ N
on the same set of players N . Notice that the excess games are strategically equivalent
to the game, but the maximal excess games are typically not. Observe that for each
x ∈ RN , the maximal excess game êx is the monotonic cover of the excess game ex, i.e.
it is the minimal monotonic game such that êx(S) ≥ ex(S) for all S ⊆ N . Moreover,
êx is non-negative; it is 0-normalized if x is individually rational (in particular when
x ∈ I(v)); it is the constant null game if x is coalitionally rational (in particular when
x ∈ C(v)). Finally, êx is superadditive if the game v is superadditive.
Making use of these induced games, Solymosi (1999) proved that in a superadditive
game, if the maximal excess game êx at an imputation x outside the core is balanced,
then there is a (Davis–Maschler type) justified objection, thus x cannot belong to the
classical bargaining set. Holzman (2001) proved that the same condition is not just
sufficient, but also necessary for the existence of a (Mas-Colell type) justified objection.
Theorem 3 (Holzman, 2001). Given a coalitional game (N, v), let x ∈ I∗(v) \ C(v).
Then, x /∈M∗MC(v) if and only if the maximal excess game êx has a non-empty core.
Next, we show that for superadditive 0-normalized games, the 0-normalization of the
maximal excess game at a preimputation is the same as the maximal excess game taken
at the positive part of the preimputation.
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Proposition 4. Let (N, v) be a 0-normalized superadditive game. Then, for any preim-
putation x, the 0-normalization of the maximal excess game at x equals the maximal
excess game taken at the payoff vector x+ consisting of the positive parts of the payoffs,
that is,
ê0x(S) = êx+(S) for all S ⊆ N,
where x+j = max{xj, 0} for all j ∈ N .
Proof. Let v be 0-normalized and superadditive. Clearly, since v is superadditive, both
ex and êx are also superadditive at all allocations x ∈ RN .
In case x is an imputation, the maximal excess game is 0-normalized. Furthermore,
x+ = x. Thus, ê0x = êx = êx+ . So, our claim trivially holds.
Let x ∈ I∗(v) \ I(v) and N−x = {j ∈ N : xj < 0}. Clearly, N−x 6= ∅, N−x 6= N , and
êx(j) = ex(j) > 0 for all j ∈ N−x .
First, we show that ê0x(S) ≤ êx+(S) for all S ⊆ N . By superadditivity of êx, if
êx(S) = ex(R) for some R ⊆ S, then R ⊇ S ∩N−x , and hence R∩N−x = S ∩N−x . Then,
ê0x(S) = êx(S)−
∑
k∈S∩N−x
êx(k)
= ex(R)−
∑
k∈R∩N−x
ex(k)
= v(R)− x(R)−
∑
k∈R∩N−x
(−xk)
= v(R)− x(R)− x−(R) with x− = x+ − x
= v(R)− x+(R) = ex+(R)
≤ êx+(R) ≤ êx+(S)
where the inequalities follow from the definition and the monotonicity of the maximal
excess game êx+ .
Next, we will show the reverse inequalities ê0x(S) ≥ êx+(S) hold for all S ⊆ N .
First, notice that x+ satisfies individual rationality in the 0-normalized game v. Let
êx+(S) = ex+(Q) for some Q ⊆ S, and assume that Q is the largest for inclusion among
such coalitions. By superadditivity of êx+ , we have Q ⊇ S∩N−x , thus Q∩N−x = S∩N−x
and x−(Q) = x−(S). Then,
êx+(S) = ex+(Q) = v(Q)− x+(Q)
= v(Q)− x(Q)− x−(Q)
= ex(Q)− x−(S)
≤ êx(Q)−
∑
k∈S∩N−x
ex(k)
≤ êx(S)−
∑
k∈S
êx(k) = ê
0
x(S)
where the inequalities follow from the definition and the monotonicity of the maximal
excess game êx.
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3 The supplier-firm-buyer market and game
We consider a market where there are three types of agents: suppliers, firms, and buyers.
Each supplier has one unit of good to sell and each buyer would like to buy at most one
unit of good where the trade between suppliers and buyers are made through firms.
Let N be the finite set of agents (players) in a market. They are partitioned in three
sets N1, N2, and N3 each of them representing one side of the market. A three-sided
assignment market consists of three sides N1, N2, N3, and a three-dimensional valuation
matrix A = (aijk)i∈N1,j∈N2,k∈N3 that represents the joint value that could be obtained by
a triplet formed by exactly one agent from each side. Notice that negative joint values
are allowed: if a buyer’s willingness to pay is lower than a supplier’s opportunity cost
(see Brandenburger and Stuart (1996) for further discussion on business value). Stuart
(1997) studied the so-called supplier-firm-buyer market, where the value of a triplet
formed by a supplier, a firm, and a buyer is generated by the separate partnerships
between the supplier and the firm, and between the firm and the buyer. On the other
hand, any of these pairwise partnerships is worthless unless completed by an agent of
the third type.1
Definition 5 (Stuart, 1997). A three-sided assignment market (N1, N2, N3;A) is a
supplier-firm-buyer market if there exist two matrices B1 = (b1ij)(i,j)∈N1×N2 and B
2 =
(b2jk)(j,k)∈N2×N3 such that aijk = b
1
ij + b
2
jk for all (i, j, k) ∈ N1 ×N2 ×N3.
Next, we introduce a cooperative game related to the supplier-firm-buyer market.
The set of players is N = N1 ∪ N2 ∪ N3. Since the smallest potentially valuable coali-
tions are the triplets formed by exactly one agent of each side, we define the triplets
together with the single-player coalitions (representing the non-cooperating agents) as
basic coalitions. We denote by
B = {{i, j, k} | (i, j, k) ∈ N1 ×N2 ×N3} ∪ {{l} | l ∈ N}
the family of basic coalitions.
The worth of basic coalitions are defined as follows. Since in supplier-firm-buyer
markets the positive added value of a triplet is assumed to be generated from the separate
and independent trade between the supplier and the firm, and from the trade between
the firm and the buyer, the value of a triplet is obtained by summing its pairs’ potential
contributions, provided it is positive; otherwise, non-cooperation is more efficient:
wA({i, j, k}) = max{b1ij + b2jk, 0} (1)
for all (i, j, k) ∈ N1×N2×N3. On the other hand, if an agent l ∈ N does not participate
in any trade, then her value is equal to zero, wA({l}) = 0.
The worth of non-basic coalitions are defined by the value of the most efficient
partition of the coalitions into basic coalitions. Formally, a basic partition of a coalition
is a family of pairwise disjoint basic coalitions whose union is the given coalition. Let
BP(S) denote the set of basic partitions of S ⊆ N . Notice that if S 6= ∅ then BP(S) 6= ∅.
1For a more general model, where the worth of a coalition is the sum of the amounts attached to all
its pairs that belong to connected sides, see Atay and Nu´n˜ez (2017).
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Then, the corresponding supplier-firm-buyer game is the pair (N,wA) where N = N1 ∪
N2 ∪ N3 is the set of players, and wA is the coalitional function defined by wA(∅) = 0
and
wA(S) = maxT ∈BP(S)
∑
T∈T
wA(T ) (2)
for all ∅ 6= S ⊆ N . The supplier-firm-buyer game is a special type of partitioning game
introduced by Kaneko and Wooders (1982). It straightforwardly follows that these
games are 0-normalized, non-negative, superadditive and monotonic.
Besides being a plausible model to study markets with middlemen, the supplier-
firm-buyer game has important properties. Most notably, Stuart (1997) showed that it
always has a non-empty core.
Proposition 6 (Stuart, 1997). Let (N1, N2, N3;A) be a supplier-firm-buyer market.
Then, the corresponding supplier-firm-buyer game (N,wA) has a non-empty core.
We will show that for supplier-firm-buyer games, the core coincides with the Mas-
Colell bargaining set, consequently, also with the classical bargaining set. To this end,
first we show that the maximal excess game of a supplier-firm-buyer game taken at any
preimputation is balanced, because it is either a supplier-firm-buyer game itself (for
imputations) or the 0-normalization of a supplier-firm-buyer game (for preimputations
which are not imputations).
Proposition 7. Let (N,wA) be a supplier-firm-buyer game. For any preimputation
(x, y, z) ∈ I∗(wA), the maximal excess game (N, ê(x,y,z)) has a non-empty core.
Proof. Let Γ = (N1, N2, N3;A) be a supplier-firm-buyer market and (N,wA) be the cor-
responding game. Given a preimputation (x, y, z) ∈ I∗(wA), we show that the maximal
excess game (N, ê(x,y,z)) is strategically equivalent to a supplier-firm-buyer game, hence
it has a non-empty core.
CASE 1: (x, y, z) ∈ C(wA). Then, ê(x,y,z) is the null game. That being so, it is
the supplier-firm-buyer game corresponding to the market (N1, N2, N3;A = 0) with null
evaluation of all basic coalitions. The null payoff vector is obviously in the core.
CASE 2: (x, y, z) /∈ C(wA), but (x, y, z) ≥ (0, 0, 0), that is, (x, y, z) is individually
rational in wA, though efficiency is not assumed.
We construct an induced market Γ = (N1, N2, N3;A) such that the corresponding
game wA equals the maximal excess game ê(x,y,z) of the initial game wA. Consider the
supplier-firm-buyer market Γ where the potential contribution of pair (i, j) ∈ N1 × N2
to a trade is b
1
ij = b
1
ij − xi − y1j and of a pair (j, k) ∈ N2 ×N3 is b
2
jk = b
2
jk − y2j − zk with
arbitrarily fixed non-negative payoffs y1j ≥ 0 and y2j ≥ 0 such that y1j + y2j = yj for all
j ∈ N2. It will turn out that the particular way we split the firms’ (nonnegative) payoffs
has no relevance. From the two matrices B
1
= (b
1
ij)(i,j)∈N1×N2 and B
2
= (b
2
jk)(j,k)∈N2×N3
we get the valuation of the triplets in the locally additive way: aijk = b
1
ij + b
2
jk for all
(i, j, k) ∈ N1 ×N2 ×N3. Then, the corresponding supplier-firm-buyer game (N,wA) is
obtained via (1) and (2).
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First we show that ê(x,y,z)(S) ≤ wA(S) for all S ⊆ N . It trivially holds, if ê(x,y,z)(S) =
0. Take an arbitrary coalition S ⊆ N with ê(x,y,z)(S) > 0, and suppose that its maximal
excess is achieved at coalition Q ⊆ S. Then, e(x,y,z)(Q) = ê(x,y,z)(S) ≥ ê(x,y,z)(Q) ≥
e(x,y,z)(Q), so all inequalities hold as equalities. We may assume without loss of generality
that Q is minimal for inclusion among such coalitions by dropping the single-player
coalitions (whose excess and payoff are zero) from the optimal basic partition for Q.
Then Q is a union of triplets, say (i1, j1, k1), . . . , (im, jm, km), all with positive excess at
(x, y, z) in the initial game wA. It follows that wA({il, jl, kl}) = ailjlkl > xil+yjl+zkl ≥ 0.
Then,
ê(x,y,z)(S) = e(x,y,z)(Q) =
m∑
l=1
e(x,y,z)({il, jl, kl})
=
m∑
l=1
[(b1iljl + b
2
jlkl
)− (xil + yjl + zkl)]
=
m∑
l=1
[
(b1iljl − xil − y1jl) + (b2jlkl − y2jl − zkl)
]
=
m∑
l=1
[b
1
iljl
+ b
2
jlkl
] ≤
m∑
l=1
wA({il, jl, kl})
≤ wA(Q) ≤ wA(S),
where y1jl ≥ 0, y2jl ≥ 0 are the fixed payoff-splits such that y1jl +y2jl = yjl for l = 1, . . . ,m.
The first two inequalities come from the definition of the game wA, the third inequality
holds by the monotonicity of supplier-firm-buyer games.
Secondly, we show the reverse inequalities ê(x,y,z)(S) ≥ wA(S) for all S ⊆ N . Again,
it trivially holds, if wA(S) = 0. Take an arbitrary coalition S ⊆ N with wA(S) > 0. Let
{i1, j1, k1}, . . . , {im, jm, km} augmented with single-player coalitions {im+1}, . . . , {ip},
{jm+1}, . . . , {jq}, {km+1}, . . . , {kr} be an optimal basic partition of S in basic coali-
tions in the game wA. We may assume that all triplets {il, jl, kl}, (l = 1, . . . ,m), have
a positive worth, wA({il, jl, kl}) > 0, (l = 1, . . . ,m), since otherwise we can decompose
them into singletons. Let R ⊆ S be the union of the triplet coalitions in {il, jl, kl},
(l = 1, . . . ,m). Then,
wA(S) =
m∑
l=1
wA({il, jl, kl}) +
∑
t∈S\R
wA({t})
=
m∑
l=1
[b
1
iljl
+ b
2
jlkl
] =
m∑
l=1
[
(b1iljl − xil − y1jl) + (b2jlkl − y2jl − zkl)
]
=
m∑
l=1
[
b1iljl + b
2
jlkl
− xil − yjl − zkl
]
=
m∑
l=1
e(x,y,z)({il, jl, kl})
= e(x,y,z)(R) ≤ ê(x,y,z)(R) ≤ ê(x,y,z)(S),
where the inequalities follow from the definition of the maximal excess game ê(x,y,z).
Since imputations are individually rational, we get that the maximal excess game
ê(x,y,z) of supplier-firm-buyer game wA taken at any (x, y, z) ∈ I(wA)\C(wA) is balanced,
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because it is the same as the supplier-firm-buyer game wA corresponding to the induced
market Γ.
CASE 3: (x, y, z) ∈ I∗(wA)\I(wA), that is, preimputation (x, y, z) violates individual
rationality in the 0-normalized and superadditive game wA. By Proposition 4, the 0-
normalization of the maximal excess game ê0(x,y,z) at (x, y, z) equals the maximal excess
game ê(x,y,z)+ taken at the payoff vector (x, y, z)
+ consisting of the positive parts of the
payoffs. Although payoff vector (x, y, z)+ violates efficiency, it is individually rational
in the game wA. It follows from CASE 2 that the maximal excess game ê(x,y,z)+ has
a non-empty core. Being strategically equivalent to its 0-normalization, the maximal
excess game ê(x,y,z) has a non-empty core.
Now, we can give our main result on the relationship between the core, the classical
bargaining set, and the Mas-Colell bargaining set for supplier-firm-buyer games.
Theorem 8. Let (N,wA) be a supplier-firm-buyer game. Then, its core C(wA) coincides
with the classical bargaining set Mi1(wA), and the Mas-Colell bargaining set M
∗
MC(wA),
C(wA) = M
i
1(wA) = M
∗
MC(wA).
Proof. Since the supplier-firm-buyer game wA is superadditive, by the comparability
result of Holzman (2001), C(wA) ⊆ Mi1(wA) ⊆ M∗MC(wA). By Proposition 7, the
maximal excess game at any preimputation has a non-empty core. Thus, by Theorem 3,
no preimputation that is not in the core can belong to the Mas-Colell bargaining set.
Consequently, all three set-valued solutions coincide.
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